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ABSTRACT: 
The article offers a critical examination of ‘borrowing’ as a form of interdisciplinary 
engagement between psychology and history. This is where specific insights from one 
discipline are used (often selectively) by the other to shed light on a specific problem 
regarding experience, human motivation, or behaviour. Using two studies on the 
social psychological aspects of the Holocaust as relevant examples, the article 
highlights some of the epistemological and conceptual tensions implicit in this form 
of interdisciplinarity. These include the role of narrative and emplotment in historical 
reconstruction, the relationship between texts and historical context, the role of 
discourse and interpretation, and the tension between universalism and particularism. 
The article considers the different ways in which some of these challenges could be 
overcome in future research endeavours, and how one might take the interdisciplinary 
study of the Holocaust, but also other instances of mass crimes and genocide, beyond 
selective ‘borrowing'.   
Keywords: psychology, history, Holocaust, interdisciplinarity, bystander behaviour, 
perpetrators. 
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The Holocaust is undoubtedly the historical event which has had the single 
most profound influence on social psychology. Not only were a number of seminal 
studies directly driven by questions posed by the dark legacy of Nazism – Adorno et 
al.’s (1950) work on the authoritarian personality, Milgram’s (1963, 1974) 
experiments on obedience, Oliner and Oliner’s (1988) study of altruistic personality 
are some relevant examples – but more generally, the inevitable question of why the 
Holocaust happened has traditionally invited explanations which are psychological in 
nature. Across the social sciences and humanities, accounts of the Holocaust 
invariably touched upon the questions of individual and collective beliefs, social 
influence, personality, the power of the situation, emotions, prejudice, aggression, etc. 
As a result, psychology – in the broadest sense – has been seen as potentially relevant 
to Holocaust scholarship, while the suffering of European Jews remained a regular 
motif in psychological literature on topics related to peace and conflict, and the 
question of why people do harm to others. On the other hand, the widespread 
acknowledgment of psychology’s relevance to Holocaust studies has been offset by 
the recognition that, on its own, psychology could only take one so far. This is 
especially the case with the (over) confident approach of the likes of Adorno, Frenkel-
Brunswik, Levinson & Sanford (1950) or Milgram (1963) whose quest for 
psychological mechanisms underpinning authoritarians and obedience  tended to 
neglect the importance of broader socio-historical factors to which historical 
scholarship has been much more sensitive.  
 All this points to the possibility that psychology and history might be 
productively brought together to shed light on the Holocaust as a historical event. And 
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yet, the necessary interdisciplinary engagement has so far been marred by long-
standing epistemological and theoretical tensions between the two areas of enquiry, 
and a climate of mutual suspicion.  As Kenneth Gergen (2001, p.82) observed, 
psychologists regularly ‘scan accounts of earlier times’, but they do so mainly in the 
quest for ‘interesting hypotheses and anecdotes’, or for confirmation that the results of 
systematic and controlled empirical research have a wider currency and the much 
coveted ecological validity. But they seldom see psychology and history as truly 
complementary. Along similar lines, Billig (2008, p.10) notes that history is for many 
psychologists an incomplete enquiry, because of the evasive ‘messiness’ of history 
and social life: as history is concerned with past events, it leaves no scope for 
hypotheses, experimental controls or the manipulation of variables. Therefore, its 
claims ‘can never be “proved” to the rigorous standards demanded by an experimental 
scientist’.   
Among historians there is an equally widespread misgiving towards historical 
enquiry that appears to be overly reliant on psychological theories and empirical 
findings (see for example, Tileagă & Byford, 2014a, also Elms, 1994 and Nicholas, 
2004).  Historiography of the Holocaust offers an illustrative example. When 
Christopher Browning (1992), one of today’s pre-eminent Holocaust historians, drew 
on Stanley Milgram’s research on obedience to highlight certain aspects of the 
conduct of German reservists who participated in the murder of Polish Jewry, he was 
promptly accused by a fellow historian, Daniel Goldhagen (1997, p.391), of offering 
an ‘ahistorical explanation’, one that has been ‘conceived in a social psychological 
laboratory’. The author of Hitler’s Willing Executioners exhibited little understanding 
for Browning’s devotion to ‘multi-causal interpretations based on multidisciplinary 
scholarship’ (Browning, 2002a, p. viii). At the core of Goldhagen’s critique was the 
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assumption that psychology’s universalist claims cannot account for the essential 
‘Germanness’ of the Holocaust and ‘the historic specificity of perpetrators […] and of 
a society that nurtured them’ (Goldhagen, 1997, p. 94). This distrust of psychology 
also reflects another concern, namely that psychology, by purporting to explain the 
actions of perpetrators (especially by highlighting their ‘ordinariness’), goes some 
way towards exonerating their actions (see also Billig, 2002; Miller, Buddie & 
Kretschmar, 2002). But, as Tindale, Munier, Wasserman and Smith (2002) have 
noted, even Goldhagen’s supposedly non-psychological thesis, invokes both 
terminology and explanations that are essentially psychological. This points to the 
unavoidability of the contact between the two disciplines when it comes to accounting 
for human behaviour and motivation, but also illustrates the widespread reluctance to 
admit that this is so.  
  The ‘Willing Executioners/Ordinary Men’ debate highlights also an important 
aspect of historical research which alienates psychologists. Christopher Browning’s 
and Daniel Goldhagen’s diametrically opposed views were derived from the 
exploration of identical material – post war testimonies which members of the 
German army’s 101st Reserve Battalion made before judicial investigators. As 
Browning openly acknowledges, ‘different historians reading the same set of 
interrogations would not produce or agree upon an identical set of “facts” – beyond an 
elementary minimum –out of which a narrative of events […] could be created’ (in 
Goldhagen, Browning & Wieseltier, 1996, p. 21). Thus, the same historical material 
can produce multiple, competing interpretations and explanations, and there are no 
means of adjudicating between them, beyond the good old-fashioned scholarly debate 
(see Billig, 1988). There is no fool-proof, ‘objective’ way or testing empirically the 
relative contribution of, for example, ‘eliminationist anti-Semitism culturally 
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imprinted over centuries’ or ‘institutional, organisational and situational factors’ 
(Browning, 2002b, p. 5).  
In spite of these obstacles to interdisciplinary dialogue, psychologists and 
historians do engage with each other’s work (see Tileagă & Byford, 2014a). In this 
article, we will focus on one form of engagement which is especially prominent in 
social psychological accounts of the Holocaust. It is what Jordanova (2006), called 
borrowing or transfer. This is where specific insights from one discipline are used 
(often selectively) by the other to shed light on a specific problem regarding human 
motivation, behaviour, and so on. When psychologists engage in borrowing from 
history (and historians), this usually involves selecting an account of a historical 
event, and then examining it through the prism of psychological research often with 
the, even if only implicit purpose of validating it or demonstrating its wider relevance. 
When historians ‘borrow’, they take on the role of the ‘seeker’ who is ‘poking about’ 
psychological literature in the quest for ‘some formula, some hypothesis, some model, 
some method which has immediate relevance to one’s own work, and which seems to 
help one to understand one’s data better and to arrange and interpret them in a more 
meaningful way’ (Stone, 1987, p. 20).     
In what follows we offer a critical examination of borrowing as a form of 
interdsciplinarity, through the analysis of two specific Holocaust-related studies. The 
first is the exploration of the rescue of Bulgarian Jews as an instance of bystander 
intervention, by Reicher, Cassidy, Wolpert, Hopkins and Levine (2006). The second 
is the book Soldaten: On Fighting, Killing and Dying by two German scholars, Sönke 
Neitzel and Harald Welzer, which explores the mentality of German officers by 
analysing covert recording of German POWs held in Allied prisons during the Second 
World War (Neitzel & Welzer, 2012).  
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Although the two studies share the focus on the Holocaust, and the desire to 
shed light on social psychological aspects of military conflict and mass crimes, they 
are nevertheless quite different. Not only do they explore different protagonists 
(bystanders and perpetrators) but they also belong to distinct traditions of scholarship. 
Reicher et al.’s (2006) work is rooted in the mainstream social psychological research 
on bystander behaviour, and draws extensively on social identity theory, an 
established approach with a venerable history in social psychology. Neitzel and 
Welzer’s (2012) book, by contrast, is an explicit collaboration between an historian 
and a psychologist which does not claim to belong to, or rely on any recognized 
tradition of psychological thinking. Their approach relies on a much looser and more 
eclectic set of psychological concepts and theories. Furthermore, while Reicher et 
al.’s (2006) study was published in a psychology journal, and speaks mainly to an 
audience of psychologists, Soldaten is fist and foremost a work of historiography, 
aimed at historians of the Third Reich and the Holocaust.  
And yet, we argue that the two studies warrant examination side by side. This 
is, first, because both are explicitly set up (and are, indeed, seen by others) as social 
psychological analyses of historical material and therefore as important attempts at 
interdisciplinary crossover. Second, they are illustrative of the two different faces of 
borrowing outlined above: Reicher et al. (2006) treat an episode from history as the 
testing ground for laboratory-based empirical findings, while Neitzel and Welzer 
(2012) approach psychology as a necessary resource for the interpretation of a unique 
kind of archival material. Third, both studies recognise the role of textual analysis of 
written or oral communication in psychological research; they engage explicitly with 
archival material to examine issues such as persuasion and identity construction 
(Reicher et al., 2006) or accounts of everyday experience and soldier ‘mentality’ 
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(Neitzel and Welzer, 2012).  Thus, both raise issues about when and how archival 
material becomes psychologically relevant data.  
In what follows we examine each study as an example of borrowing, 
highlighting some of the epistemological and conceptual tensions implicit in this form 
of interdisciplinarity. These include the role of narrative and emplotment in historical 
reconstruction, the relationship between texts, discourse and interpretation, and the 
issue of universalism vs particularism. We then proceed to consider the different ways 
in which some of these challenges could be overcome in future research, and how one 
might take the interdisciplinary study of the Holocaust, but also other instances of 
mass crimes and genocide, beyond ‘borrowing’.    
 
THE SURVIVAL OF BULGARIAN JEWS: A CASE OF ‘BYSTANDER 
INTERVENTION’? 
The first example of borrowing which we consider is Reicher et al.’s (2006) 
social psychological examination of the rescue of Bulgarian Jews from deportation to 
Nazi concentration camps in March 1943. The central premise of Reicher et al.’s 
(2006) study is that the survival of Bulgarian Jews was a case of successful bystander 
intervention, and one of the rare cases in the history of the Holocaust where non-
Jewish bystanders prevented the destruction of their Jewish neighbours.  In fact, 
Bulgaria is described by Reicher et al. (2006, p. 53) as the venue of ‘perhaps the most 
remarkable case of rescue’, not just because the majority of the country’s Jewish 
population survived the war, but because this resulted from a collective effort by 
bystanders: a ‘social movement’ against the persecution of Jews is said to have 
‘stopped deportation in its tracks’. The specific focus of the study are arguments 
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which opinion makers in Bulgaria used to mobilise the wider community against 
various antisemitic measures initiated by the country’s pro-Nazi government. By 
analysing a collection of translated archival documents published in a volume edited 
by the Bulgarian philosopher Tzvetan Todorov (2001), Reicher et al. (2006) conclude 
that the successful mobilisation of opposition to anti-Jewish measures involved three 
types of argument. The first was to present Jews as fellow ‘Bulgarians’ and therefore 
as part of the national ‘ingroup’, the second was to construct Jews as an ‘outgroup’, 
but one that should be protected because solidarity towards victims of injustice is a 
key component of the Bulgarian national identity and character, while the third 
stipulated that not protecting the Jewish ‘outgroup’ would be potentially harmful to 
Bulgaria’s interests on the international stage.  
Reicher et al. (2006) examined the Bulgarian case in the context of the 
emerging empirical and theoretical work on the social identity model of bystander 
intervention which views helping behaviour as a function of group relations. 
Experimental research has shown that bystanders are more likely to intervene in a 
crisis situation if the person in need is perceived as a fellow member of a salient 
‘ingroup’ (e.g. Levine, Prosser, Evans & Reicher, 2005) or when normative behaviour 
within the ‘ingroup’ includes an obligation to attend those in need regardless of group 
membership (see Hopkins, Harrison, Levine & Cassidy, 2004). The Bulgarian case 
study is seen as extending this research by showing how social identity-related 
determinants of bystander intervention can be incorporated into efforts to mobilise 
potential helpers into collective action. Also, the divergent categorisation of Jews in 
relation to the national ‘ingroup’ and ‘outgroup’ is noted as an example of the 
rhetorical nature of categorisation which Steven Reicher in particular has highlighted 
in his work (e.g. Reicher and Hopkins, 2001).  Boundaries between groups (in this 
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case ‘Bulgarians’ and ‘Jews’) are seen  neither as fixed in empirical reality nor as a 
function of cognitive and perceptual processes, but as situationally contingent 
rhetorical accomplishments which are produced in the argumentative context 
surrounding social mobilisation and the construction of national identity. 
As well as being a study of the social identity aspects of bystander behaviour, 
Reicher et al.’s (2006) article is framed as an enquiry into a historical event, one that 
makes a direct contribution to Holocaust scholarship. By explaining the success of the 
mobilisation efforts in Bulgaria, a ‘rhetorical social identity perspective’ is said to 
offer a new angle in the study of rescue during the Holocaust, one which looks 
beyond the ‘structural and political conditions of rescue’ or the personality traits 
underpinning individual acts of altruism towards Jews (Reicher et al.,2006, p. 53). 
Since its publication, the study has been cited in numerous works on helping 
behaviour and group processes as a pertinent demonstration of the importance of 
social identity in the mobilisation of helping behaviour (e.g. Klein, Spears & Reicher, 
2007; Levine, Cassidy&  Jentzsch,  2010; Morton, Homsey & Postmes, 2009; Passini 
& Morselli, 2009; Rooyackers & Verkuyten, 2012;Thomas & McGarty, 2009). What 
is more, the study’s historical focus has been noted as its particularly valuable 
dimension, one that demonstrates that social identity model of helping operates in 
‘real life and not just in laboratory settings (Hopkins et al., 2007;  Šubašić, Reynolds 
& Turner, 2008). Thus,  within this specific area of social psychological research, the 
story of the rescue of Bulgarian Jews is gradually becoming one of those illustrative 
examples which help connect ‘the catalogues of experimental and empirical material 
with the world of the known’, thus enabling psychologists to ‘integrate psychological 
research with the social world’ (Manning, Levine and Collins, 2007, p. 559).  
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 In social psychological writing on bystander intervention, when attempts are 
made to take research into the ‘real world’– whether in order to verify experimental 
findings or to generate new hypotheses – the spotlight tends to fall on those ‘real life 
events’ which are already seen, discussed and remembered in public discourse as 
involving bystander behaviour. The murder of Kitty Genovese in New York in 1964 
(Latane and Darley, 1970), or the abduction and murder of James Bulger in 
Merseyside, UK in 1993 (Levine, 1999) came under scrutiny from psychologists 
interested in bystander behaviour, precisely because they were already perceived as 
instances where bystanders could and should have made a difference. The same can 
be said to apply to Reicher et al.’s (2006) study. Their choice of example was 
undoubtedly influenced by the fact that in Holocaust literature and public memory the 
survival of Bulgarian Jews is commonly construed as an instance of bystander 
intervention, an example of collective humanity and selflessness (see Arendt, 1970; 
Bejski, 1986; Boyadjieff, 1989; Goldhagen, 1997; Paunovski & Illel, 2000). The 
notion of collective rescue is also entrenched in Bulgarian national memory, where it 
survives as a potent myth that reinforces positive national self-presentation. In the 
words of the Bulgarian anthropologist Ivaylo Ditchev, the idea of collective rescue 
has become, over the years, a powerful ‘screen memory behind which a new national 
pride can be constructed in times of crisis’ (cited in Secor, 2001, p. 34). 
However, in setting up the relevant ‘historical context’ of their study, Reicher 
et al. (2006) recognise that the survival of Bulgarian Jews has been the topic of 
considerable public and scholarly debate. The reader is warned that available 
historical literature ‘must be handled with care’ given that ‘accounts of Jewish 
survival [in Bulgaria] are coloured by ideological bias, with differing sources wishing 
to allocate credit to different actors’ (p. 54). This is an allusion, first and foremost, to 
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the fierce debate, which raged for the duration of the communist era, between on the 
one hand regime historians who attributed the survival of Bulgaria’s Jews to the 
activism of the country’s workers’ movement and its leadership, and on the other 
hand royalist circles in the diaspora who saw King Boris as the key figure in the 
rescue (see Oren, 1968; Todorov, 2001). Since the end of the Cold War the focus 
shifted away from the involvement in the rescue of the communist party, although the 
relative contribution of the King, individuals from within the country’s political 
establishment, the Bulgarian elite, or ‘the Bulgarian people’ as a whole are still 
widely debated. 
Contested history of this kind presents a challenge for social psychologists. As 
was mentioned in the introduction, because much of social psychology focuses on 
behaviour in the present, psychologists can claim to have a direct and unmediated 
access to their object of study. In the context of experimental research in particular, 
psychologists are involved in the design and creation of the data they analyse. The 
only available and therefore authoritative description of ‘events’ and the conduct of 
the protagonists within an experimental situation is that supplied by the researcher 
who has direct access to ‘what happened’ (see Edwards, 1992). Historians do not have 
that luxury: they deal with ‘data’ that, because its locus is in the past, is always 
imperfect, incomplete, contingent on interpretation, mediated through sources 
(Jordanova, 2006, p. 170). 
In an attempt to resolve the inconsistency between different historical 
interpretations, Reicher et al. (2006, p. 54) opted for a strategy that involved focusing 
on ‘what is agreed between a number of texts’. Rather than engaging with the 
contrasting viewpoints and seeking to establish the relative merits of the different 
sources (not all of which are equally tarnished by ‘ideological bias’) the authors rely 
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on what they argue is ‘considerable consensus…as to what happened and who was 
involved in the rescue’. To many historians this might seem like a curious 
methodological approach. It implies that all the sources consulted – which range from 
a commemorative volume endorsed by the former Bulgarian dictator Todor Zhivkov 
(Cohen & Assa, 1977), through various encyclopaedic entries and relatively brief 
reflections on the rescue of Bulgaria’s Jews (Arendt, 1970; Ben Yakov, 1990; Genov 
& Baeva, 2003), to a number of lengthier and more comprehensive examinations of 
this topic (Bar-Zohar, 1998; Boyadjieff, 1989; Chary, 1972; Todorov, 2001) – deserve 
to be treated as equally credible. It also assumes that the extraction of the common 
denominator among the different versions eliminates ‘bias’ and renders the variability 
in historical interpretation immaterial.  
While unusual in the context of historical scholarship, in a piece of 
psychological research this approach is perhaps less unexpected.  The appeal to 
consensus is a common feature of what Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) refer to as 
‘empiricist repertoire’ which permeates experimental psychology (see also Potter, 
1996). The empiricist repertoire paints a picture of a stable, empirically knowable, 
‘out-there’, world. The task of the psychologist is to describe this world as a 
collection of agreements on knowable and uncontroversial ‘facts’. The appeal to 
consensus is manifested, for example, in the emphasis on inter-rater, or inter-observer 
reliability, which, in the absence of more ‘objective’ criteria for establishing ‘what is 
going on’ in the context of a study, treats agreement as a marker of objectivity and 
positions a concurred upon version of events as unproblematic and value-free. Thus, 
Reicher et al. (2006) employ the tools of their own discipline to create – or borrow - a 
single, usable account, one that can be presented as containing a dispassionate and 
widely accepted historical verity.  
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However, a closer scrutiny of Reicher et al.’s (2006) study reveals important 
limitations of this approach to historical reconstruction. The outcome is a rather 
distorted, simplistic account of the ‘historical context’, one that is neither factually 
correct, nor free from ‘ideological bias’. In fact, most of the relevant historical sources 
on the survival of Bulgarian Jews, including some of the works consulted by Reicher 
et al. (2006), casts doubt on the essential premise of their study: these sources view 
the rescue of Bulgarian Jews as anything but a clear-cut instance of ‘bystander 
behaviour’. While acknowledging the reality of public protests, most historians fall 
short of attributing the cancellation of the deportations in March 1943 to their 
effectiveness. On the contrary, they argue that the ‘bystanders’ involved in the 
protests were not instrumental to the rescue of Bulgarian Jews, and that those who 
‘ultimately’ did save them can hardly be described as ‘bystanders’. 
For example, in his influential early account of the survival of Bulgarian Jews, 
Frederic Chary (1972) points out that public protests, whose rhetoric Reicher et al. 
(2006) analyse in detail, had very little consequence: they were something that the 
Bulgarian king and his government had to live with, but it was not something that 
they necessarily took great notice of. This is because the pro-German government 
enjoyed widespread support from the Bulgarian public, largely due to the fact that 
through collaboration with Nazi Germany, it fulfilled the nationalist dream of 
territorial expansion in Dobrudja, Macedonia and Thrace (see also Oren, 1968). Thus, 
for much of the war ‘the philo-Semites in the opposition protested, but the 
government carried on its work’ (Chary, 1972, p. 191, see also Todorov, 2001). 
Rather than placing public protest at the centre of the ‘rescue’, historical literature 
emphasises that in the spring of 1943 factors above and beyond the protests made a 
critical contribution to the change in government policy:  Germany’s military setbacks 
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in Africa and the Eastern Front, pressure from the allied governments to facilitate the 
evacuation of its Jewish population to Turkey and Palestine, and so on (Bar Zohar, 
1998; Chary, 1972; Feingold, 1970; Oren, 1968; Todorov, 2001). Therefore, the 
decisions about whether or not to deport Jews to the Nazi camps were the result of 
complex political calculations.  
Moreover, if there is a single act of public protest that did influence the last 
minute decision to cancel the deportations, it was the petition to the Prime Minister 
Bogdan Filov, initiated in March 1943 by Dimitar Peshev, the vice-president of the 
Bulgarian parliament. To describe this as an instance of ‘bystander behaviour’ would 
be misleading.  The petition was signed not by public figures and church leaders who 
led the largely ineffective dissent in previous years, but by 42 members of the 
Bulgarian parliament from the government benches. This means that, contrary to the 
way in which it is presented by Reicher et al. (2006), this crucial petition was not part 
of the long-standing public campaign against antisemitic measures. On the contrary, 
the main reason why it was successful is because it signalled the emergence of dissent 
within the ruling elite, among members of the same the ‘rubber stamp parliament’ 
which in previous years passed the antisemitic laws that provoked public opposition 
(Chary, 1972, p.189). In other words, Peshev was able to stop the ‘deportations in its 
tracks’ (as Reicher et al. put it) not because he was a caring ‘bystander’, but because 
he was part of the pro-German political regime which Raul Hilberg’s book 
Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders (1993) categorises firmly among the ‘perpetrators’.  
This interpretation casts the events of 1943 in a completely different light to 
that found in Reicher et al. (2006). It suggests that the topic which warrants 
exploration is not what made bystanders effective, but how ‘those who planned to 
place Bulgarian Jews in a situation which would have required their rescue […] never 
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completed their plans?’ (Bar-Zohar, 1998, p. 198, see Oren, 1968 for a similar 
argument). Also, Ilel (2000) criticised the popular narratives of ‘rescue’ for their 
tendency to portray Jews, at least implicitly, as a passive community reliant on the 
compassion of the munificent Bulgarian ‘bystanders’ who protested on their behalf. 
For the duration of the war, Bulgarian Jews themselves consistently sought to 
mobilise public opinion against anti-Semitic measures, and to influence individuals 
close to the government. In fact, one such intervention, in the town of Kyustendil 
played a crucial role in the dramatic events that preceded the cancellation of the 
deportations in March 1943 (Bar Zohar, 1998; Chary, 1972; Todorov, 2001). 
This broader and more complex political dynamic behind the survival of 
Bulgarian Jews suggests that ‘rescuers’ were not a clearly identifiable category and 
source of political agency, distinct from (intended) victims or perpetrators (Chary, 
1972). This is an important point because the whole tradition of psychological 
research on bystander behaviour is predicated on the assumption that there is a 
triangle of clearly demarcated roles: the victim, the perpetrator and the bystander.  In 
experimental research on bystander behaviour, including that which draws on social 
identity theory, the boundaries between the three categories are treated as fixed.  In an 
experiment, the ‘emergency situation’ is set up, by design, as an interaction between 
the ‘bystander’ (the participant) and a person requiring help. The distribution of roles 
is unambiguous and the course of events carefully managed.  
Beyond the laboratory, however, this division is not clear-cut. In fact, the 
debates about the ‘rescue’, which Reicher et al. (2006) simply cast aside by focusing 
on points of ‘consensus’ are in fact debates about the categories of ‘perpetrator’, 
‘victim’, ‘rescuer’, about their meaning and their inherently pliable boundaries. As 
Victoria Barnet (1999, p.11) put it, during the Holocaust, ‘psychologically and 
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historically, bystanders, perpetrators and rescuers stood at different points along the 
same continuum. Some individuals who began as bystanders later became actively 
involved in the genocide. A minority of people moved in the opposite direction, and 
became rescuers or members of resistance groups’ (for a comparable argument see 
also Hilberg, 1993; Marrus, 1987; Niewyk & Nikosia, 2000). Reicher et al. (2006), by 
implying that the roles were distinct and mutually exclusive, fail to recognise the 
‘infinite gradations of moral responsibility’ (Cohen, 2001, p.143) and the way in 
which rescue always involved ‘a complex social configuration’ (Andrieu, 2010, p. 
506).  
The fact that Reicher et al. (2006) do not engage with the malleable, and 
political, nature of the term ‘bystander’, is the outcome of interdisciplinary 
borrowing: they read history through the prism of psychology and re-presented, or re-
versioned it in a way that made it as well-matched as possible to what happens in a 
piece of psychological research. Condor (2003, p.176) noted this as a more general 
feature of research within the tradition of social identity theory, especially when it 
comes to the ‘vexing problem of generalisation from the experimental laboratory to 
the “real world”. She points to the ‘straightforward strategy’ whereby researchers 
‘adjust [their] vision of the “real world” until it coincides with the parameters of the 
laboratory’.  
However, what makes this approach surprising in the case of Reicher et al.’s 
(2006) study is that one of their fundamental assumptions is that social categories are 
inherently rhetorical, and constructed through argument. The analysis of historical 
documents pertaining to the survival of Bulgarian Jews explores the possibility that 
the division between categories  - ‘ingroup’ and ‘outgroup’, Bulgarians and Jews - are 
contestable and fluid and that the boundaries between them are negotiated in the 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, HISTORY AND THE STUDY OF THE HOLOCAUST 
 
 18 
course of social interaction (see also Billig, 1987, Billig, et al. 1988, Edwards, 1997, 
Wetherell & Potter, 1992). And yet, the tools of constructionist, rhetorical analysis are 
never applied to the analytical categories that the authors themselves use:  the fact that 
labels ‘perpetrators’, ‘bystanders’ and ‘victims’ are also rhetorical, used to forge 
identities, justify ideological positions, make accusations or defend against them is 
overlooked. This might be seen as an example of what Woolgar and Pawluch (1985, 
p. 216) termed ‘ontological gerrymandering’: categories chosen for analysis are 
treated as rhetorical constructions, without engaging with the possibility that the same 
can be said of the categories upon which the analysis depends. Potter (1996, p.40), 
refers to the same phenomenon as ‘selective reification’. Thus, in the Reicher et al.’s 
(2006) study, the ‘classic triangle of roles’ (Bauman, 2003) not only remains 
unproblematized, but it guides the reading of historical material and the subsequent 
analysis of archival documents.  
A further limitation of Reicher et al.’s argument, which can be seen as another 
symptom of interdisciplinary borrowing is the attempt to partial out, or separate the 
rhetorical analysis of the documents from the process of historical reconstruction, that 
is, from determining ‘what happened and who was involved’. Only after the story of 
survival had been ‘emplotted’ as one of rescue, do the authors proceed to analyse a 
selection of archival texts. In some ways, this approach is consistent with what goes in 
psychological research: running the experiment (including describing what went on in 
the experimental situation) and the analysis of the data are two distinct, sequentially 
ordered processes. But, when dealing with historical material, a different approach is 
necessary: the selection and analysis of documents must always guide, and 
simultaneously be guided by the practice of historical reconstruction. The two 
processes are constituted within, and inseparable from, each other. The Reicher et 
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al.’s (2006) study illustrates why this is so: both the choice of documents, and the 
focus of the analysis, were (pre)determined by the narrative to which they subscribed. 
It is the narrative of ‘rescue’ and ‘bystander intervention’ that made the documents 
collected by Todorov (2001) – and not other historical material, including that 
pertaining to the structural and political factors – relevant ‘data’.  
The various limitations of the Reicher et al.’s (2006) study which we 
examined here illustrate what happens when an attempt is made to assimilate history 
within psychology’s investigative apparatus; an apparatus does not tolerate historical 
controversy, contingency or ambiguity. As we have seen, a lot gets lost in the course 
of interdisciplinary translation implicit in this form of borrowing. What is required 
instead is a more integrated approach, one that ensures two-directional traffic between 
psychology and history, and which, rather than seeking to tame the inherent 
‘messiness’ of history, turns it into an object of enquiry. This is an issue that we will 
return to in the conclusion.   
 
WAR AS WORK? RECONSTRUCTING THE MIND-SET OF THE WERMACHT 
SOLDIER 
In much of the literature on the social psychological aspects of the Holocaust 
engagement with history tends to be confined to secondary sources (e.g. Baum,2008; 
Miller, 2004; Newman & Erber, 2001; Staub, 1996, 2003). Just like in the case of 
Reicher et al. (2006), rather than delving into the archives and becoming engrossed in 
the complexities involved in the reconstruction of the past, writers have tended to rely 
on published accounts and used them as the basis of a psychological interpretation.    
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 The second example considered in this article takes a very different approach. 
The book Soldaten: On Fighting, Killing and Dying was co-authored by two German 
scholars, the historian Sönke Neitzel and social psychologist Harald Welzer. The 
focus of this joint project was the conduct of perpetrators and the ‘mentality’ of 
German soldiers and high ranking officers, explored through the analysis of secret 
recordings of conversations among German POWs collected by the British 
intelligence services between 1942 and 1945.  This is, therefore, a kind of 
interdisciplinary engagement where a historian and a psychologist come together and 
apply their diverse expertise to solve problems, and shed light on motivations, 
feelings and behaviour of a group of people at a particular point in history.  
In the years preceding the publication of Soldaten, Sönke Neitzel, the historian 
of the two authors, had published a small number of articles on the secret recordings 
(which he uncovered in 2001, shortly after they were declassified), as well as a book 
containing a selection of the transcripts (Nietzel, 2007). However, as he reveals in the 
‘Prologue’ to Soldaten, up until his collaboration with a psychologist he made only 
‘scant progress in evaluating and interpreting this source material’ (Neitzel, 2012, p. 
viii). The reason was not just the sheer quantity of the archival data (tens of thousands 
of pages of transcripts) but also its nature. To make sense of the recordings, it was 
necessary to go beyond the scope of a single discipline. As his co-author explains:  
 ‘as a social psychologist without a profound knowledge of the Wehrmacht, I 
would never be able to interpret the material historically. Conversely, someone 
with a purely historical perspective would never be able to decode all the 
communicative and psychological aspects of the protocols […] Only by 
combining our disciplines, social psychology and history, would we be able to 
do justice to the material as a source for reconstructing a particular mentality 
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and arrive at a revised perspective on soldiers’ behaviour’ (Weltzer, 2012, p. 
ix)  
 What made the material especially appealing to the authors is that it promised 
a unique insight into the mind, the ‘mentality’ of the German military. In the authors’ 
view, the protocols were not yet another historical source, to be considered alongside 
documents, diaries and post-war testimonies in the attempt to shed light on the 
motives of those who killed and died for the Third Reich. According to Weltzer, 
sources that had been previously available to historians were inherently ‘problematic’. 
‘Official investigations, letters from the field, eyewitness reports, and memoirs’ share 
the same shortcoming: ‘they were consciously composed and addressed to someone 
specific: a prosecutor, a wife at home or an audience the authors wanted to win over’ 
(p. ix). The secret recordings, referred to as the ‘protocols’, on the other hand, 
appeared devoid of an ‘agenda’: ‘men were talking live, in real time about the war and 
their attitudes towards it’ (p.ix). In the surveillance protocols ‘the speakers do not 
address their statements to any external moral arena’ (Neitzel & Welzer, 2012, p. 
150). This is routine talk, in ‘real time’ (a phrase frequently used to describe the data), 
among people who inhabit the ‘one and the same world’ (p.4). Captured on tape and 
later transcribed, these conversations are believed to cut through the uncertainties 
inherent in conventional historical sources, and offer a glimpse into the perpetrators’ 
inner world and ‘the relationship between individuals and their actions’ (p.6).  
 The protocols, however, do not speak for themselves: their understanding, the 
authors argue, requires an explanatory framework (in this case, a psychological one) 
that can elucidate what ‘goes on’ in Wehrmacht soldiers’ minds. In the quest for this 
framework, and in providing a psychological insight into the conduct of German 
soldiers, the authors pay only a fleeting reference to the tradition of experimental 
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social psychology. The classics of psychological research that over the years had been 
routinely used to account for the conduct of the different protagonists of the 
Holocaust - the Stanford prison experiments or Milgram’s work on obedience - are 
mentioned in passing. Instead, the central analytic concept is that of ‘frames of 
reference’.  Drawing loosely on the work of Goffman (1986), Nietzel and Weltzer 
(2012) describe ‘frames’ as anything that might ‘influence, guide and even steer’ a 
person’s perceptions and interpretations of, and orientations to, the world around 
them. Frames are said to underpin people’s ‘routines, habits and certainties’ and 
provide ‘preprogrammed and accessible’ answers to the question ‘what is going on 
here?’ (Nietzel & Welzer, 2012, p. 9). Vaguely defined in this way, frames resemble 
both the traditional psychological notion of schema (Fiske & Linville, 1980), and 
Moscovici’s (1984) social representations. Like schemas they are said to provide 
cognitive efficiency: frames are shortcuts that ‘save individual human beings a 
colossal amount of work’ (Nietzel & Welzer, 2012, p. 9); like social representations 
they are inherently social, in that they draw on ‘a corpus of cultural orientation and 
knowledge’ (p.9). Also, frames are said to be hierarchically structured: they range 
from ‘frames of the first order’ that include ‘the broader sociohistorical backdrop 
against which people in a given time operate’, all the way down to those that function 
at the ‘level of psychology’ and include ‘personal dispositions and individual decision 
making’ (p.10). 
And yet, throughout the book these ‘frames of reference’ remain vaguely 
defined, and there is no theoretical elaboration of what they are or how they operate 
psychologically. There is, similarly, no attempt to illuminate the interplay between 
different frames, or look at how the sociohistorical context might, for example, 
influence the individual psychological functioning of perpetrators, or vice versa. This 
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is surprising because the idea that individual beliefs, motivations and behaviour 
cannot be understood outside the micro and macro socio-political contexts is one that 
one finds in both in psychology and historiography (Browning, 1992), and is therefore 
an obvious candidate topic for interdisciplinary scholarship. And yet, Neitzel and 
Weltzer’s (2012) book does not venture that far. We would like to suggest that this is 
a feature of interdisciplinary borrowing. Soldaten is first and foremost a work of 
historiography, and psychological insights are brought in, selectively, to buttress a 
specific historical argument. For this purpose, concepts borrowed from psychology 
needed to be made quite basic and straightforward; they needed to be diluted, and 
administered to the readership in manageable doses.    
At the same time, engagement with psychology left an important mark on the 
book. Nietzel and Weltzer’s (2012) most wide-ranging conclusion is that the situation 
in which soldiers had found themselves had a profound influence on their conduct and 
way of thinking: the demands of armed conflict and the immediate context of war 
affected their actions and ‘mentality’. This is a leaf straight from the book of 
traditional, experimental social psychology, where interpretations of human behaviour 
had traditionally focused on the power of the situation – social roles, presence of 
authority, social influence, propaganda, etc.  
The situationalism underpinning Nietzel and Weltzer’s (2012) argument is 
especially apparent in the idea of ‘war as work’ which permeates the book and which 
overshadows any discussion of the ‘frames of reference’ which are specifically related 
to the historical context of the Holocaust, the broader military project of Nazi 
Germany and the ideology of National Socialism, or indeed those that relate to 
‘personal disposition’ of individual soldiers. The suggestion here is that war itself 
imposes a world view and pattern of behaviour (a ‘frame of reference’) that makes 
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violence possible, and in some sense inevitable. Soldiers, it is claimed, kill because 
‘fighting is their job’ (pp.6, 339, 343) because violence and destruction are demanded 
by the ‘customs of war’ (p.75). The authors take this argument one step further to 
argue that ideology played a minor role in the conduct of the Wermacht soldiers, and 
that its effect is often overemphasised: ‘ideology may provide reasons for war, but it 
does not explain why soldiers kill or commit war crimes’ (pp. 319-320). Also, they 
argue that the same ‘frame of reference of war’, defines the conduct of soldiers in any 
war. It is therefore ‘timeless’ and universal (Nietzel, 2013, p.12). War, according to 
Nietzel and Weltzer (2012) brutalises those how take part in it, distorts their sense of 
perspective and makes acts of violence, whether those inflicted by them, or against 
them, as normal. The frame of reference ‘war as work’ makes people commit acts that 
‘in civilian life, we would interpret as revolting, horrible, even criminal’. In the 
conclusion to the Soldaten the same explanation is offered for the conduct of soldiers 
serving in Vietnam, Iraq or Afghanistan.  
These conclusions are, of course, highly simplistic, especially in the light of 
the numerous works on the Holocaust which, even though they relied on what Nietzel 
and Welzer (2012) called ‘imperfect sources’, have yielded much more nuanced 
analyses, and have shown that perpetrator behaviour is the outcome of a complex 
interplay of factors in which ‘war’ was a necessary, but not sufficient condition, and 
where National Socialist ideology and indoctrination certainly played a part in the 
normalisation of violence. But as Michael Billig has noted, when history is explored 
through the eyes of social psychology, the particularities of the world are often 
ignored, in favour of universal conclusions (Billig, 2014). In the hands of 
psychologists, Billig argues, ‘general concepts become greedy concepts, devouring 
the individual, unique features of the social world’ (p. 236). The ‘frame of reference 
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of war’ is precisely one such ‘greedy’, universalising concept. Of course, we don’t 
know if it was the engagement with psychology that led Nietzel and Weltzer (2012) to 
a universalist and situationalist conclusion, or whether their hunches about the 
importance of ‘war as work’ led them to seek confirmation in a psychological 
interpretation. Either way, the interdisciplinary engagement in evidence here bears the 
hallmarks of interdisciplinary borrowing.     
In the case of Soldaten, however, the perils of borrowing are not apparent just 
in the way in which authors use the concept of ‘frames of reference’ to make sense of, 
and draw conclusions from, the protocols. They are also to be found in the treatment 
of the protocols themselves. As was already noted, the authors treat the archival 
material – which Sönke Neitzel (2012, p. vii) refers to on one occasion as his ‘buried 
treasure’ – as a ‘quasi-magical time machine’ (Ashmore, MacMillan & Brown, 2004: 
p.355) that provides an unmediated evidentiary record of the German soldiers’ 
motivations and mentality. This stance towards the data warrants further scrutiny. For 
one thing, it treats the protocols ahistorically: it omits the fact that the transcripts are 
themselves an artefact with its own history, mediated by the specific institutional, 
social, legal and political dynamic of surveillance work in Allied prisons during the 
Second World War. For example, not all the conversations among prisoners of war 
were recorded and transcribed, but only those that were of interest to those doing the 
surveillance. Thus, the protocols include material selected by individuals whose 
agenda at the time was different to that of scholars revisiting the data more than half a 
century later. Similarly, many of the soldiers knew, or at least suspected that they 
were being recoded, and the authors of Soldaten simply assume that this made no 
difference to the content of their conversations. Perhaps most importantly, the 
protocols do not offer a unique key to the soldier’s ‘mentality’ in time of war: they 
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offer access to the way in which captured combatants spoke to each other about war, 
and how they remembered their life prior to capture. In that sense, this data is not any 
less ‘mediated’ than post war interrogations, memoirs, war-time letters and diaries, 
etc. It is just that they are mediated by different things, namely a different 
interactional and social context. The soldiers descriptions of their experiences were, 
just like any account, a form of social action, a means of doing something in the 
present – negotiating a particular identity position, positioning a view or action in 
relation to prevailing cultural norms, managing accountability, both their own and that 
of fellow soldiers. And yet the protocols were never analysed as such. This exposes a 
further shortcoming of interdisciplinary borrowing: as historical documents are 
prepared for psychological examination, they are stripped of their own history, of the 
dynamic underpinning their own production. They are promoted into a static snapshot 
of a ‘mentality’, to which analytical tools borrowed from psychology could be 
unproblematically applied and from which generalised conclusions about conduct in 
war could be drawn.  
  
CONCLUSION 
Over the past half century, a number of leading figures in social psychology have 
argued that their discipline is in needs of a historical and cultural ‘turn’. Keneth 
Gergen (1973, p.319) argued that psychology ought to be concerned with the 
‘systematic study of social history’, while Moscovici (1987, p.514) called for 
psychology to become a form of ‘anthropology of modern culture’. Implicit in both 
arguments is the still often ignored recognition that the human condition is socially 
and historically bounded and that psychology can benefit greatly from a closer 
engagement with other disciplines, including history. However, as we argued in this 
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article, for the collaboration between psychology and history to be productive, the 
engagement needs to overcome the perils inherent in the today all-too-common 
practice of interdisciplinary ‘borrowing’. 
 Before we proceed to consider some of the broader issues raised in the article, 
it is important to note that our aim here is not to provide coherent and definitive 
recommendations about how to overcome the shortcomings of borrowing, or to 
propose a set of guidelines about how to ‘do interdisciplinarity’. Interdisciplinarity, 
after all, is a dynamic, evolving and multifaceted process. Instead, we shall simply 
point out some broader themes and areas of concern brought to light by our 
exploration of ‘borrowing’, that could be seen as starting points for closer engagement 
between social psychology and history,     
First, a frequently noted tension between psychology and history lies in their 
different preoccupation with, and emphasis on, the universal and the particular. Some 
historians will argue convincingly that history is a discipline of the particular; that it is 
the story of a specific historical context, an account or interpretation of an event 
played out by actors in a particular time and place. Many psychologists, on the other 
hand, regard psychology as a discipline of the general and the universal, one that 
aspires to uncover generic laws of human behaviour that transcend specific historical 
conditions and the unique, context-dependent experience and behaviour of 
individuals. It might therefore be argued that interdisciplinarity is predicated on 
finding a way of doing history and psychology in a way that transcends this 
difference. The two studies on the Holocaust examined in this article illustrate why 
borrowing, as a common form of interdisciplinary engagement, can sometimes fail to 
meet this goal. In both examples, behind the proclaimed interest in a specific 
historical event - the Holocaust - lurks an aspiration for generalisation and universal 
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application. Just as in Soldaten the generic ‘frame of reference of war’ is deemed to 
account equally well for the conduct of soldiers in any war, so in the Reicher at al. 
(2006, p.53) study, the specific case of Bulgarian Jews is said to offer broader lessons 
about the social identity model of helping and how it could be used to ‘avoid 
atrocities in the future’. This penchant for general, universalist conclusions is part of 
the intellectual baggage that, in the context of borrowing, psychology brings to 
interdisciplinary enquiry. It is as if psychological insights must contain a universal 
message in order to be recognised as psychologically valid or relevant. The tendency 
towards universalism has been especially prominent in research on mass crimes and 
genocide, probably because of the imperative to draw lessons from history. Yet as 
Michael Billig (2014, p. 236), points out, the emphasis on the universal message often 
results in ‘bland generalities’ rather than genuine interdisciplinary understanding of 
history. Therefore, while drawing parallels across historical examples might be 
possible and potentially useful, treating extrapolation and generalisation as key aims 
of psychological analysis have shown themselves to be a barrier to the study of 
historical phenomena.  
Second, an important consequence of borrowing which we identified is 
simplification, and perhaps trivialisation, of both of psychology and of history. 
Reicher et al.’s (2006) engagement with Holocaust historiography resulted in a 
simplified version of the story of the rescue of Bulgarian Jews, which smoothed over 
the disagreements that have divided opinion over the past half century. The authors of 
Soldaten, on the other hand, simplified psychology: they borrowed a basic concept of 
‘frames of reference’, stripped it of its ontological and epistemological complexity, 
and applied it, in a matter of fact way, to historical material. The central issue here is 
that interdisciplinarity, if it is to offer genuine insights, must strive to complicate 
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rather than simplify things. A researcher’s incursion into a different field of enquiry 
must invite questions about their own discipline’s theoretical scaffolding, its 
underlining assumptions, choice of data, and methods of analysis. The question, 
therefore, should not be whether a historical example validates existing models and 
theories, or how a psychological concept can be selectively utilised in the context of 
historical interpretation. Engagement with history must lead psychologists to reassess 
some of their own conceptual apparatus, for example by considering the negotiated 
and conditional nature of categories used in psychology, in this instance, that of 
‘bystander’. The controversy about the rescue of Bulgarian Jews, rather than being 
side-lined, could have been made an integral part of analysis in a way that would 
generate conclusions of relevance to both psychology and history. For instance, how 
are protagonists of the Holocaust constituted as ‘bystanders’ or ‘perpetrators’? How 
are these different labels and descriptions negotiated both at the time and in 
subsequent accounts? What are the possible implications of the rhetorical nature of 
categories for the current ways of thinking about bystander behaviour in psychology? 
Put differently, the notion of ‘bystander’ is inherently historical, and as such it stands 
at the core, rather than outside, the purview of interdisciplinary analysis.  
Equally, adding psychological texture to historical enquiry ought to push 
historians to reassess some of their own assumptions about the way in which 
psychological topics - mentalities, social representations, stereotypes, inner conflicts, 
memories, habits, and so on – precisely because they are inherently historical, can be 
made a central part of their investigations. The analysis in Soldaten should therefore 
have gone beyond superimposing the ‘frame of reference’ analytic framework on the 
data, and embraced a more reflexive approach to the protocols as a cultural artefact, 
recognising its interactional and situated dimensions, and considering the implications 
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of this for psycho-historical analysis of the materials and conclusions that can be 
drawn from it.  
All this is important also because borrowing, which is inherently selective, 
invites researchers to focus on historical examples, or psychological insights, which 
are most likely to confirm a predetermined interpretation. It is presumably comforting 
for psychologists to ‘discover’ that their theoretical hunches, models, theories have 
ecological validity, that the real world maps onto, or organizes itself in a way that is 
predicted by psychological theory. And yet, as we have seen, this can have the 
unintended consequence of limiting, rather than expanding, the range of questions that 
psychologists are asking about their object of study. It is similarly comforting for 
historians to ‘discover’ that their intuitions regarding people’s motives can be 
clarified or corroborated by a piece of psychological research or conceptual 
framework.  Yet they need to be aware of psychology’s own limitations when it 
comes to describing experience. The vocabulary of psychological sciences can lure 
the historian into a false sense of confidence about the depth and reach of his or her 
interpretations.  
The main point here is that interdisciplinary analysis, if it is to transcend some 
of the problems of borrowing, needs to be transformative rather than confirmatory: its 
objective ought to be to reshape both psychological and historical ways of thinking, 
shifting each discipline’s centre of gravity in the direction of closer engagement with 
each other. Interdisciplinarity, therefore, requires a level of conceptual reflexivity that 
will ensure that the human condition is recognised, at all times, as both psychological 
and historical (Tileagă & Byford, 2014b). This will place, at the centre of the enquiry, 
the question about how historical conditions, ideologies and cultural traditions 
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produce and sustain, while at the same time being constituted in, particular forms of 
individual and collective thought and action.  
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